Session 6: Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma

Political Realism and Political Liberalism are two dominant theories in the study of International Relations which explain the existing global political scenario and/or how it should be. Naturally, both have their flaws. Where one seems too harsh in its ideas and assumptions, the other is a rather utopian idea of a world that is peaceful. John Herz, in his work ‘Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’ explains the problems of the above mentioned theories and presents the theory of Realist Liberalism as a combination of both. This Realist Liberalism basically takes on the ideas of the two dominant themes, eradicates the differences and fills the gap that exists between them. Later on, authors like Jervis have drawn upon the significance of his work by elaborating on the security dilemma.

At a first glance, the works of both these authors seem commendable. However, on looking closely one may criticize Herz of being hasty with his conclusions. It seems that he found an easy way out by taking the good points of both theories and combining them into one to suggest that the world would be in a better position to work if it followed that. In theory, yes, that might turn out to be true however; its applicability in the real world may again be problematic. Herz could have applied his theory to an existing scenario in the global world politics and explained his case better.

Yet another problem I find is that with the debate about the security dilemma. Quoting the examples of nuclear arms race or the Anglo-German naval race it is often suggested that nations or states are power hungry. They wish to acquire as much of it as they can to protect themselves. Rival states look at it as a threat against them and start building upon their own military resources. This turns into a ‘vicious cycle of security and power accumulation’. Living in an anarchical world you cannot say what the other state is up to and so you have to rely on yourself.

Kenneth Waltz points out that the actions of the states depend on the circumstances of the states. For example, if a state is surrounded by strong nations, it feels less of a threat from any outside forces; therefore it will not embark upon building military resources. In another situation, the accumulation of such resources also depends upon the economic capability of the states. If they are not economically well off, they will not be able to gather enough or the required security elements. On the other hand, states like India and Pakistan that share a violent history are bitter towards each other and always suspicious of the activities of the other feel a constant threat by the other. Hence, they feel the need to build upon their nuclear weapons to signal their strengths to the other party. There are also cases where the expansionist nature of the leader is quite clear and one cannot misinterpret their intentions therefore the other states feel the need to arm up against them. An example of this would be of Hitler in the Nazi Germany. The point here is to say that idea of the existing security dilemma is flawed too. By saying that states are power hungry and are trapped in the ‘vicious cycle of security and power accumulation’ the writers ignore the socio-cultural factors that would limit the likelihood of such an extreme outcome.  They should instead come up with ideas as to how or why states would avoid creating a security dilemma, and even if there seems to be some threat by or to another, attempts are made to reassure the other are successful.