Realist Liberalism - One Small Step for Herz, A Giant Leap for IR Kind

Herz puts forth an interesting notion in his article in the form Realist Liberalism; and while a couple of my fellows have questioned its viability, I still believe this alternative view of the security dilemma can offer valuable insights into understanding the state of modern International Relations – both for what they are, and what they ought to be.

Indeed, Realist Liberalism, a brew of Realist and Idealist streams of thought that are usually seen as competing worldviews, does take upon itself a rather huge task – primarily in the form of consolidating clashing ideologies. Yet, to write off Herz’s ideas merely on the basis of the magnitude of the task it hopes to undertake would be unfair, if not also, unwise.

Criticism can be raised on the basis of compromising too much on the cores of both realist and utopian theories, with some even pointing it out as merely an ‘easy way out’. Even a willingness to soothe the reservations each side has against the other can be seen, perhaps a bit too much of it even.

Yet, in sum, the over-arching theory can be seen to be a step in the right direction. Particularly, in the sense that both realist/ideologist concepts are used not as deconstructive opposites, but rather as consolidating partners that bridge over the weaknesses that either theory possesses individually. This is a hugely forward looking glance at International Relations as they stand today, with too many theories boxing up ideas in selective, non-comprehensive manners – the realists lacking the element of positive action in their approach (much of which can be useful considering the contemptible contemporary international environment); and the ideologists/utopians lacking a more in touch with reality view of things as they stand on which to build the foundations of solid progress.

Far too often, and worryingly, for far too long, theories of ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’ have stood as rivals. While in truth, with mere intuition and a bit of steady thought, one can infer that there is no ‘what ought to be’ without first understanding ‘what is’; and alternatively, criminally irresponsible to not propose some degree of ‘what ought to be’ when one see’s the ‘what is’ in the current mode of homo sapiens sapiens existence as a society.