Session 12: “Great powers should always act like good offensive realists”

The introductory chapter of the book, ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’, J. Mearshemier, discusses about the ruthless power struggle that exists between states. Mearsheimer posits his theory of Offensive Realism which provides a rather bleak picture of the international politics which contrasts with the prospects of perpetual peace, a notion that gained popularity at the end of Cold War era and was thought to be attained through economic and political engagement. The book provides a critique to the Liberalist approach of theorizing and understanding International Relations and differentiates between the types of Realist approaches to decipher why states pursue power.

His theory is a structural theory and is based on three major assumptions: absence of central authority (anarchy), offensive military capabilities and uncertainty about other states intentions. All these factors are essential in understanding why states are aggressive. He emphasizes on the structure of the international system which dictate the behavior of states, that is, it forces them to act aggressively towards others in order to secure themselves; “survival mandates aggressive behavior”. He doesn't pay heed to domestic conditions like ideology or individuals playing a role in determining state behavior.

His theory focuses on great powers because they are the most influential actors in the international system. Since states are concerned with surviving in the anarchic world and there is an absence of a central agency to protect states from each other, states aim to increase one’s relative power over the other to become secure and survive in the anarchic world.  The state looks for opportunities to gain power (relative military capability) over the other state; maximizing relative power equates with maximizing security (assurance of survival). This entails that maximum security can only be achieved if the great powers pursue hegemony and that is a result of the structure of the international system.

He challenges the prevailing optimism about relationships between states and elaborates on the ‘tragedy’ of great power politics. He discusses how states don’t want to be aggressive, but in order to survive in a system where there is a constant fear of another state gaining more power, ample to become a hegemon, who can manipulate weaker states, there is constant power struggle and a race for increasing respective military strength relatively to the other state; the focus on relative increase is to ensure that a state has enough military assets to put up a serious fight, enough to leave the other state seriously weakened.

The theory is descriptive in nature, how states behaved and are likely to behave, and additionally a prescriptive theory which offers the best ways of survival in the ruthless world; “Great powers should always act like good offensive realists” if they wish to survive.

Mearsheimer has not only provided a reasonable understanding of state behavior in international system, but the actual strength of Mearsheimer’s theory lies in his acknowledgement of the limitations and drawbacks that his theory possesses; the example of Germany not waging war against France in 1905 goes against the prediction set by Offensive Realism, regardless, the acceptance of such a limitation is what stood out apart from the tenants of the theory. Similarly, his recognition regarding the ‘indeterminacy’ of the theory in the case of security competition during Cold War further adds to the credibility of his work.