Session 4 - "Fetish for Measurement?"

The methods of theorizing in International relations can broadly be classified into two: the classical approach and the scientific approach. The classical approach draws on philosophy, history, tradition and law and impresses upon the ability to employ keen judgment while theorizing, while the scientific approach places confidence in logic, empirical procedures and mathematical proofs. The struggle for supremacy between the two methodologies has led to tensions within the discipline. Proponents of the classical approach, use of which can be traced back to theorists such as Machiavelli and Morgenthau, have sought to negate the efforts of those who advocate the relatively newer, scientific methodological approach. Hedley Bull is one such scholar, who through his seven propositions in “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach” has made his distaste for the use of scientific methods in theorizing in the IR arena abundantly clear. 

The crux of Bull’s argument is that by using scientific methods, theorists are at risk of being reductionist. By restricting themselves to what can be logically or empirically proven, scientific theorists are impinging upon their own capacity to analyze and employ judgment. Bull also claims that most of the work done by scientific theorists has its basis in the classical approach – i.e. it requires analysis of history, philosophy and existing theories – and is redundant. Furthermore, he believes that the scientific approach oversimplifies and makes generalizations that are unable to explain the moral phenomena in international relations. 

 Although I do not fully agree with Bull’s unabashed criticism of the scientific approach to theorizing (a mixed method approach seems most feasible, which will ensure ‘precision and rigor’ in theorizing), an empirical or mathematical approach does indeed have many flaws. First of all, creating a model on which to base and test hypotheses pertaining to international relations can be problematic. According to Bull, there are an “unmanageable number of variables”, each with their own assumptions and generalizations, used to justify thoughts and ideas, which oversimplifies and complicates matters at the same time. In addition, it is also difficult to ascertain results of tests as perspectives and biases of theorists differ. Kenneth Waltz also has similar reservations regarding the scientific approach: “Staring at the same set of data, the parties to the debate came to sharply different conclusions, for the images they entertained led them to select and interpret the data in different ways”. In addition, it is imperative to keep in mind that global politics are not static. World events have verified and falsified ideas and theories which have subsequently led to the evolution of the discipline of IR, itself. Therefore, it is difficult to fit events and relations between states into set criteria to give credibility to a hypothesis or theory.

Although I would like to commend Bull on how well structured and reader-friendly his article was, I felt as if his cynicism only thinly veiled his outrage at the prospect of theorists using the scientific approach gaining further ground and credibility in the realm of international relations - at the expense of the classical approach. “They see themselves as tough-minded and expert new men, taking over and effete and woolly discipline, or pseudo discipline, which has so far managed by some strange quirk to evade the scientific method but has always been bound to succumb to it in the end”. While it was entertaining to read the article (rant) I do feel as if elaborating on the merits of the scientific approach to theorizing might have helped balance out Bull’s clear bias against the break from tradition.