Session 6 - Chasing the Rabbit

Anarchy and the continuous quest for security makes cooperation among states seem impossible. Robert Jervis in his article “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma” explores the possibility of states cooperating in order to achieve a common interest. As there is no overarching power to ensure cooperation, Jervis maintains that interaction between states may bring about mutual rewards or may have disastrous consequences. 

Jervis takes a game theoretical approach to explaining the security interests that states may possess and how they may be pursued. Jervis uses Rousseau’s “Stag Hunt” in order to shed light on the possible outcomes of states attempting to cooperate in order to establish a more stable security environment. The outcomes include: stability under cooperation and universal disarmament; an arms competition accompanied by a high risk of war; maintaining a high level of arms while others are disarmed and; disarming, while the other states are investing heavily in militarization and promoting security interests. While the ideal situation is one where all states agree to cooperate and then stick to their agreements, the more realistic outcome is one where all the states involved pursue their security interests out of fear of being exploited. This fear of being subjugated or losing their sovereignty is what Jervis believes drives states to defect from cooperation and fuels the security dilemma each state finds itself embroiled in. 

Security in the existing world order is a zero-sum game. Many of the ways a state tries to increase its security have a negative impact on the security of other states. Pakistan and India serve to be excellent examples of the threat one country’s security measures may pose to the other. Pakistan’s decision to embark on a journey to acquire Nuclear weapons came about directly as a response to India’s development of nuclear arsenal (which incidentally was the response to China acquiring nuclear weapons). Additionally, Pakistan’s refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until India agrees to sign the Treaty also gives credence to the fact that a state’s pursuit of security and military strength, is more or less charted out by what it perceives its threat to be. 

Another very interesting aspect of Jervis’ article was the reference to Metternich’s justification for supervising the politics of Italian states: “Every state is absolutely sovereign in its internal affairs… However, any false or pernicious step taken by any state in its internal affairs may disturb the repose of another state, and this consequent disturbance of another state’s repose constitutes an interference in the state’s internal affairs”. This implies that a state’s foreign policy and domestic politics are often unknowingly shaped by those of other states, especially those which it may be geographically contiguous with. Jervis gives the example of Britain and Austria after the Napoleonic Wars: Although Britain maintained its isolated position in regional politics, Austria’s policies had to be “closely attuned to all conflicts” in the continent. Similarly, a Tunisian man’s protest against an unjust government lit a spark that set ablaze the entire Middle East. Demonstrations and subsequent government clampdown on protests were mirrored all across the region, leading to unrest and further instability domestically, as well as on an international level.

Overall, Jervis has done a remarkable job in breaking down the security dilemma to the pursuit of offensive and defensive strategies. His simplistic approach towards analyzing states engaging in international cooperation in a system of anarchy must be commended.