Wednesday, March 11, 2015

Session 13: Cult of Offensive and WWI

Preceding WWI, the ‘cult of offensive’ swept through Europe, offensive military doctrine was glorified and adopted as warfare strategies for security and survival. Cult of Offensive refers to the strategic military dilemma which made leaders believe that being the attacker was beneficial on the battlefield and having offensive capabilities was advantageous since the opponent could be completely annihilated and not reciprocate, leaving wars to be short and decisive. The idea that the aggressor would be victorious discredited the use of defensive tactics. But to much dismay, it was the arrogance that infiltrated the statesman of the times which led to a downward spiral and the outbreak of WWI.

Evera points out to the five dangers of the dominance of Offense: states adopt more aggressive foreign policies to exploit new opportunities and avert new dangers (temptation to expand and form alliances to become secure), risk of preemptive war increase, “windows” of opportunity and vulnerability become wider (risk of preventive war), competitive styles of diplomacy, states enforce tighter political and military secrecy. Vera has argued that these dangers were prominent in the outbreak of WWI because the ‘cult of Offensive’ had created and magnified the perceived threat of one states offense being greater than the other (linking back to the idea of increasing relatively greater power to ensure that states are capable of ensuing serious harm to the opponent during battle-Mearsheimer).

The problem with this aspect and Offensive Realism generally is that the state’s actions are based on the perception about the opponent’s military strength.  To assume that war is an outcome of strategic analysis of the opponents intentions is naïve and fallacious; two vital elements of false intentions have to do with a) underestimating the opponents military capability and its likelihood of success, b) failure to accept the contrary view which doesn’t reconcile or corroborate the states predisposed idea about the opponent.








2 comments:

  1. Good points and I agree that the perception problem is one of the biggest issues with offensive realism. That being said, even if states misperceive other states' intentions, will this really affect their behavior? After all, since states aim to maximize their power - that is if we're to believe offensive realism - then won't they continue to expand irrespective of full and accurate information? And isn't full and accurate information essentially impossible to get?

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  2. If you look at the status quo, maybe misperception isn't the key behind strengthening one's military capabilities, instead balance of power makes more sense. And you're right, only in a utopian world will you gain accurate infornation and peace

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