Session 14: The Question We Must Ask

Since the start of this course, we have read a lot about the rationale of a state that is willing to arm itself. We delved into the reasons why there is nuclear proliferation, and what fuels the quest to become the hegemon. Yet, if there is anything that plagues the world the strongest, it is terrorism. And while the theories we have understood do apply to the question of negotiation, we need to address this integral policy question more directly, and much more seriously.

Many recognize that the world needs to stand valiantly against terrorism, in a manner that is strong, uncompromising and honest. Yet, many feel that there is still room for negotiation with terrorists, that we have tried to fight this war on terror for too long and things have only gotten worse. So, should we compromise?

Personally, I take a strong anti-negotiation stance. And my case against negotiations relies upon an understanding of the implications of a historical breakdown in negotiation plans. We tried negotiating with the Taliban, most significantly in 2004, 2005, 2008 and they betrayed the government time and time again, and got stronger each time. Since terrorists massacre guiltless individuals, they cannot be trusted to value any agreement or concession. Baitullah Mesud became a more prominent figure after the government negotiated with him; therefore, negotiations also embolden these leaders. Another important fact is that negotiations are used as a strategic tool to buy time and for organizations to regroup. In the case of the Swat Agreement, when violence ended and terrorists were no longer threatened, they were able to devise a plan to move closer to Pakistan’s capital and plan a more threatening attack.

The principle reason for not negotiating with terrorists is also relevant, that governments must not bow down to those who have attacked countless innocent beings, and there is no room for legitimacy to be given to such violence. It is in short, a disgrace to the lives we have lost. Negotiations legitimize terrorists, and with greater legitimacy, there is greater violence.

Moreover, the IRA is often viewed as the primary example by proponents of negotiating with terrorists, what they fail to recognize is. British forces and IRA continued violence against each other during negotiations. The IRA example involves the use of violence, thus, it cannot be used to portray the success of negotiations as it could equally, and more convincingly be argued that aggression played a greater role in the IRA giving up on violence.

Yes, terrorists do react to any threat of violence. But the truth is, that it is the only way. If we begin to negotiate with them, they will only get stronger. And it is not like warfare has never worked. It did in the case of the Tamil Tigers and Abu Suyyaf, and it will again.