In "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War", StephenVan Evera ideationally expounds the causes of the First World War which helps to understand the mechanism of the international system prior to the war. Furthermore it is important to use this analysis to compare it to how differently states interact today. The way war was viewed before the two world wars provides a stark contrast to the way war is regarded currently - is the fear of unfathomable destruction preventing a "window" for a third world war? From war being the opiate of the leaders during WWI, it is interesting to see how 'the cult of the offensive' has changed the way states interact today and to see whether they are more circumspect or more irrational in their policy formation.
The essay provides a very holistic picture of how rhetoric and jingoism prevalent in most European societies aggravated a war which had already started brewing when the European nations recognized Germany's expansionist inclinations. Evera puts this into perspective when he says "other nations displayed milder symptoms of the same virus" so to suggest that the political climate at the time was so sensitive that many of the nations displayed disproportionate behavior to a perceived threat. While offensive strategies at the time were conceived as more farsighted policies employed by nations to prevent future wars and to prevent the windows of vulnerability, it is ironic to see that they plunged themselves into a far more destructive ordeal.
Evera also suggests that nation states were immersed in a misguided comparative advantage race to emerge as the nations with the absolute advantage. As mentioned later in the article, "security was not Germany's only concern, nor was it a genuine one," which suggests that survival was more of a scapegoat used to conceal the desire to create "an Empire under the sun for themselves" which scared the others. Thus began a trend of opportunistic behavior embodied first by Germany which through a domino effect later trickled into the systems of other European nations. Obviously, it would not be entirely true to hold Germany responsible for feeding off expansionism to redefine the status quo in Europe for the main pioneers of expansionism were the British. Since collaboration at the time was out of the question, the bandwagon logic and a quick offensive war was seen as the only means to power and survival at a time when Social Darwinism had such a great influence on policy makers. To spare the anachronism, the dogma regarding colonial possessions can be seen as a rendition of slavery in the sense that it became a necessity to own colonies else it would guarantee insecurity instead of power; essentially this mindset made leaders more receptive to war.
In context to the offensive cult, it would be safe to suggest that it came more as a product of wanting to test new hard power; Britain had been the colonial hegemon as well as a powerful nation but the new organization of states after the Franco-Prussian wars necessitated a war to decide the 'Balance of Power'. Based on the quotes Evera has provided, it is clear that leaders were much more receptive to war as they saw it as a factor that would strengthen not only their international bearing but would unite their citizenry as well. Applying the game-theoretic model here, leaders were more opportunistic when it came to war because they saw it as a way to gain not only more power for the State but for themselves as well by being able to control a larger patronage at the end of the day. As suggested by Evera, many of these nations pursued a 'marriage of convenience' policy which constructed a faulty web of alliances making the cult of the offensive a more relevant phenomenon and war an inevitable calamity.
His argument of looking at the past for suggesting ways to operate in the future is interesting. How war is caused by the perception surrounding it anf how those perceptions also keep changing over time. There was a "cult of the offensive" before WW1 but after that, in the inter war period, some policies of appeasement possibly led to another world war. Then the Cold War period, in which both the superpowers had second trike nuclear capability and the cult of the offensive was no longer present as the defense was perceived to be a stronger force and that acted as a deterrence to war. Thus proving that the mere perception of people towards the relative advantages between offensive and defense can be an actual cause of war, thus the shift in perceptions should be kept in mind and in check in the future.
ReplyDeleteIt is true that 'cult of the offensive' no longer existed once both superpowers had second strike capability in the Cold War. But I would consider it to be relevant at the time when the Cold War began. Although it is debatable, it can be said that the USA perceived the USSR as a greater threat than it really was in 1945.
ReplyDeleteI think you have to remember that WWI was NOT started by "Germany's expansionist ambitions" and rather out of - according to Van Evera - the "cult of the offensive". WWII can be chalked up to German aggression, but not WWI. Also, I'm not convinced that the cult of the offensive came from the desire to test hard power. Instead, I think it is more related to prior military planning.
ReplyDeleteAlso, awesome comment Rida. Perception matters and, in fact, there is a great book by Robert Jervis about Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics that expounds on this theme.
Mariyam, I think that some U.S. policy makers did view the USSR as a real threat, but I think that many more used it as a justification for their own purposes. For example, threat inflation leads to more $ for the military.
All in all, decent post Scheharazade, though more precision on the implications of the cult of the offensive would have strengthened your argument.