Stephan Evera provides an explanation for the causes of the World War I. There he assumes that the fear of states and the insecurity they feel for each other are the reasons why states had gone for war. Stephan has critiqued Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism in the sense that the advantages of states being on defensive side are more than the incentives of states being aggressive, and it is usually an environment of vulnerability and susceptibility to lose against other great powers that loom around the states' thinking into policy making matters in WWI.
One argues that Stephan arguments to critique offensive realism are sound, because he has provided enough evidence where it could be deduced that states had gone for war since they believed that it is the only practical way of achieving security for themselves. For instance, he mentions that Germany feared that if they did not go for expansionist strategies then the survival of German state would be impossible in the continent of Europe. The most striking thing is that the Germans had perceived such a threat to their security even before any such attack was preempted by their rival states.
Hence, Stephan argues that Russia, Germany, Austria and France perceived the similar feelings of insecurities when they perceived the movements of each other's forces to fight and gain competitive advantage over one another. One thing of significance must be elucidated that any delay in the movement of forces to the borders of the rival states were thought of as a menace of losing one's own territory. Hence, one gets an impression that in World War I the states largely preempted policies that were produced due to their fear of losing in the imminent war. One believes that Stephan is right in arguing that states were fearful because they thought that only the aggressor had advantages into the preemptive war and the state that come second only ended up losing its "assets and territory."
One argues that Stephan arguments to critique offensive realism are sound, because he has provided enough evidence where it could be deduced that states had gone for war since they believed that it is the only practical way of achieving security for themselves. For instance, he mentions that Germany feared that if they did not go for expansionist strategies then the survival of German state would be impossible in the continent of Europe. The most striking thing is that the Germans had perceived such a threat to their security even before any such attack was preempted by their rival states.
Hence, Stephan argues that Russia, Germany, Austria and France perceived the similar feelings of insecurities when they perceived the movements of each other's forces to fight and gain competitive advantage over one another. One thing of significance must be elucidated that any delay in the movement of forces to the borders of the rival states were thought of as a menace of losing one's own territory. Hence, one gets an impression that in World War I the states largely preempted policies that were produced due to their fear of losing in the imminent war. One believes that Stephan is right in arguing that states were fearful because they thought that only the aggressor had advantages into the preemptive war and the state that come second only ended up losing its "assets and territory."
Yes, the "cult of the offensive" encouraged preemptive action by states and led into an eruption of war in Europe.
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